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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal by 
virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(i) in 
that this appeal was taken from an order of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court for Utah County over which the Utah Court of Appeals-
does not have original appellate jurisdiction. The defendant/ 
appellee/cross-appellant is entitled to its appeal as a matter of 
right by virtue of the order of the trial court entered herein on 
April 30, 1990, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
appeal: 
1. Does a life insurance company effectively terminate 
temporary life insurance coverage simply by rejection of the 
insurance application and notice to the applicant of that rejection 
prior to his death, or must the insurer also return the initial 
premium and provide written notice of rejection, even where the 
applicant has received actual notice of the rejection and has no 
expectation of coverage? 
2. Did the trial court err in determining that the 
Stevensons did not receive adequate notice of the rejection of 
LaMar Stevenson's application for life insurance? 
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3. Did the trial court err in determining that the 
amount of life insurance which became effective upon issuance of 
the conditional receipt was $300,000? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues 2 and 3 above present factual questions, while 
issue 1 presents a purely legal question. This court recently 
articulated its settled standard of review for considering factual 
and legal challenges to summary judgment in Ron Case Roofing and 
Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989), stating: 
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only 
when no genuine issues of material fact exist 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); see, 
e.g., Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Insurance Co., 
714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986). In determining 
whether the trial court correctly found that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact, we 
view the facts and inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
losing party. E.G., id. at 649; Atlas Corp. v. 
Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 
1987); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 701 P.2d 
795, 802 (Utah 1985). And in deciding whether 
the trial court properly granted judgment as a 
matter of law to the prevailing party, we give 
no deference to the trial court's view of the 
law; we review it for correctness. E.G., Atlas 
Corp., 737 P. 2d at 229; Kimball v. Campbell, 
699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); see also Scharf 
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Id. at 1385. Under this standard of review, the court should give 
no deference to the trial court's view of the law under Smith v. 
Westland Life Insurance Company, 539 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1975), that 
written notice and return of premium are necessary to the termina-
tion of a temporary contract of life insurance, but should review 
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the law, de novo for correctness. On issues 2 and 3, concerning 
the court's implicit determination that no material facts exist as 
to the adequacy of the notice of rejection of the life insurance 
application and as to the amount of coverage created by the 
conditional receipt, this court should view the facts and infer-
ences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to First 
Colony Life Insurance Company and reverse the summary judgment 
unless it is clear that no genuine issues of material fact exist. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
LaMar Stevenson was killed in an automobile accident on 
October 16, 1986. The plaintiff and appellee, Maurine Stevenson, 
filed this action against First Colony Insurance Company and 
others, claiming, among other things, that a valid temporary 
contract of insurance existed at the time of her husband's death. 
Defendant and appellant First Colony Life Insurance 
Company filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the 
temporary contract of insurance created by the conditional receipt 
was terminated by First Colony's rejection of LaMar Stevenson's 
insurance application and notification to Mr. Stevenson of that 
rejection. The plaintiff countered with a motion for summary 
judgment arguing that the contract remained in force as a result of 
the failure of defendant to give written notice of the rejection 
and failure to return the premium prior to LaMar Stevenson's death. 
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Without oral argument, the trial court granted plain-
tiff's motion for summary judgment and denied First Colony's motion 
for summary judgment, relying upon the authority of the California 
Supreme Court case of Smith v. Westland Life Insurance Company, 539 
P.2d 433 (Cal. 1975), and holding that "because there was not 
adequate notice that plaintiff's temporary insurance had been 
cancelled, and because the premium was not returned timely, the 
contract was in full force and effect at the time of Mr Stevenson's 
death." R. 296-297. A copy of Judge Harding's Memorandum Decision 
is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 to the Addendum. After objections^ 
and oral argument over the amount of the coverage, the court 
ultimately entered judgment in the amount of $300,000 plus inter-
est. 
On April 30, 1990, the court entered an order for Rule 
54(b) certification. R. 487-488. 
Defendant/appellee and cross-appellant First Colony filed 
its notice of appeal with the court on May 16, 1990, appealing the 
order granting plaintiff summary judgment and denying the motion of 
First Colony Life Insurance Company for summary judgment. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In May of 198 6, Roger Fleiss, LaMar Stevenson's insurance 
agent employed by Talbert Agency, recommended to LaMar Stevenson 
that he obtain a life insurance policy with First Colony Life 
Insurance Company. R. 124, 144-147. On June 30, 1986, LaMar 
Stevenson filled out and signed an application for life insurance 
4 
with First Colony and on July 7, 1986, he gave his agent a check 
payable to First Colony in the amount of $410 as an initial premium 
payment. R. 124, 149-150. The check for $410 was forwarded to 
United Underwriters, the general agent in the State of Utah for 
First Colony Life Insurance Company. United Underwriters negotiat-
ed the check. 
On that same date, July 7, 1986, Norman Close, another 
agent of LaMar Stevenson and employee of the Talbert Agency, 
issued, on behalf of First Colony Life Insurance Company, a 
conditional receipt stating that coverage was dependent upon the 
insurer's determination of whether or not the applicant was 
insurable. R. 124, 152. A copy of the conditional receipt given 
to LaMar Stevenson is attached hereto as Exhibit 2 to the Addendum 
of this brief. 
At the time the conditional receipt was issued on July 7, 
1986, it was standard practice in the life insurance industry that 
a conditional receipt not be issued for more than $250,000, a 
practice which was followed by First Colony Life Insurance Company. 
Affidavit of Leonard Reynolds, R. 349-350. First Colony Life 
Insurance Company intended to issue the conditional receipt for the 
amount of $250,000, a sum which is $50,000 less than the $300,000 
amount which the conditional receipt specifically establishes as an 
amount which cannot be exceeded. Affidavit of Loretta Stacey and 
attached exhibit, R. 351-353. Upon receipt of LaMar Stevenson's 
insurance application, United Underwriters informed the Talbert 
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office that First Colony would not bind coverage under a condition-
al receipt for more than $250,000. Exhibit A to Affidavit of 
Loretta Stacey, R. 353. Talbert, in turn, informed the Stevensons 
and it was agreed that the amount of insurance effective under the 
conditional receipt was $250,000. R. 353. Norman Close testified 
that Exhibit A of the Loretta Stacey affidavit was accurate in 
stating that Mr. Stevenson agreed to temporary coverage under the 
conditional receipt being limited to $250,000. Transcript of 
Norman Close Deposition pp. 93-94, 98. Copies of these pages are 
attached hereto as part of Exhibit 6 of the addendum. 
In August of 1986, First Colony Life Insurance Company 
notified Talbert Corporation that the life insurance application of 
LaMar Stevenson had been rejected and defendants Roger Fleiss and 
Talbert Corporation notified the Stevensons that First Colony had 
rejected the life insurance application. R. 154-158, 161. 
Plaintiff Maurine Stevenson specifically acknowledged in her 
deposition testimony that she was told that First Colony had 
declined coverage on LaMar. Maurine Stevenson deposition, pp. 46-
48, 105 and 106, R. 154-158; see e^ lso Plaintiff's Answers to 
Interrogatories at p. 3, R. 161. Copies of pages 46-48, 105 and 
106 of the transcript of the deposition of Maurine Stevenson are 
attached hereto as Exhibit 3 of the Addendum. As of August, 1986, 
the Stevensons knew that First Colony Life Insurance Company had 
denied LaMar Stevenson's application and that insurance was not in 
force. R. 154-158. One month later, on October 1, 1986, LaMar 
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Stevenson signed and submitted an application for life insurance 
with Banker's Life Insurance Company which specifically disclosed 
that he had been declined by First Colony due to the Chapter 11 
bankruptcy status of his business. R. 168. A copy of the signa-
ture page of this insurance application to Banker's Life Company is 
attached to this brief as Exhibit 4 of the Addendum. 
On September 29, 1986, United Underwriters, the general 
agent for First Colony, advised Mr. Stevenson's agents, Roger 
Fleiss and Talbert Corporation, that First Colony was closing its 
file and would return the premium within ten days. R. 256, para. 
7; see also R. 284, Entry for 9-29-86. At no time did First Colony 
or United Underwriters ever refuse to refund Stevenson's premium 
deposit; Maurine Stevenson testified that she knew First Colony had 
denied the application, but understood that the premium would be 
returned to the agent and used to apply with another company. R. 
342-343. She was not disturbed by the fact that the premium was 
not returned. R. 343. See Exhibit 3 of the Addendum, p. 105 and 
106. 
LaMar Stevenson was killed in an automobile accident on 
October 16, 1986, before Banker's Life had finished processing his 
insurance application. R. 125, 170. Due to oversight on the part 
of employees of United Underwriters, the premium deposit of $410 
was not returned until after Mr. Stevenson's death, on December 4, 
1986. R. 125, 172-173. 
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First Colony denied coverage for the death of LaMar 
Stevenson because it had effectively terminated the temporary 
insurance contract in question by rejecting the application and 
providing notice of the rejection to the Stevensons over one and 
one-half months prior to LaMar Stevenson's accidental death on 
October 16, 1986. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S RELEVANT FACTS 
The brief of appellant, already on file with this court, 
contains a section entitled "Relevant Facts" at pages 4, 5 and 6. 
None of the factual statements contained in this section of 
appellant's brief makes an appropriate reference to the record on 
appeal, and many of the statements made therein and in other parts 
of the brief contradict facts established in the record. 
A copy of the conditional receipt issued to LaMar 
Stevenson is part of the record in this case, R. 152, and is 
attached as Exhibit 2 of the Addendum to this brief. The second 
paragraph of that conditional receipt reads as follows: 
SECOND. LIMITS PROVISION: MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF INSURANCE 
WHICH MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE PRIOR TO POLICY DELIVERY. The 
total amount of life insurance and ADB which may become 
effective prior to policy delivery cannot exceed 
$300,000. 
R. 152. The brief of appellant repeatedly characterizes this 
language of the conditional receipt as "small print" (Brief of 
Appellant at 3, 8, 11, 18), "not clear enough to be binding" (Brief 
of Appellant at 7) , "neither plain nor conspicuous" (Brief of 
Appellant at 14), "ambiguous" (Brief of Appellant at 15). This 
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court need only review the conditional receipt to understand that 
the limitation language quoted above is clear, plain, conspicuous, 
unambiguous, and printed in the same size type as the rest of the 
conditional receipt. 
Appellant's brief asserts that no one explained the terms 
of the [conditional] receipt to Mr. Stevenson, citing from page 45 
of the transcript of the deposition of Norman Close. In fact, the 
testimony of Norman Close is simply that he did not talk to LaMar 
about the conditional receipt. As set forth in the factual 
statement above, upon receipt of LaMar Stevenson's insurance 
application, United Underwriters informed Stevenson's agents at 
Talbert that First Colony would not bind coverage under a condi-
tional receipt for more than $250,000. Exhibit A to the Affidavit 
of Loretta Stacey, R. 353. The Talbert office, in turn called Mr. 
Stevenson, who agreed to drop down to $250,000 which would fall 
within the limits of coverage which could be bound by the condi-
tional receipt. R. 353. When confronted with this evidence later 
in his deposition, Mr. Close confirmed its accuracy. Norman Close 
Deposition transcript pp. 93, 94 and 98. Copies of these pages are 
attached as part of Exhibit 6 to the addendum. 
LaMar Stevenson's understanding that coverage would be 
limited to $250,000 under the conditional receipt, is further 
supported by the fact that the initial complaint in this action 
contained a prayer for relieve of $250,000. In addition, it is 
supported by the undisputed evidence that after he was declined by 
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First Colony, LaMar Stevenson made a subsequent application to 
Bankers Life for $250,000. R. 167. 
The depositions of Roger Fleiss and Maurine Stevenson 
were taken on May 10 and July 26, 1989, respectively; however, 
defendants did not have an opportunity to fully discover from Roger 
Fleiss and Maurine Stevenson facts concerning the amount of 
coverage LaMar applied for, because at the time of the depositions, 
plaintiff's claim was for $250,000 and the amount of coverage was 
not at issue. On October 2, 1989, plaintiff filed a motion for 
leave to amend the complaint to raise the amount of damages prayed 
for from $250,000 to $500,000. The amended complaint was filed 
following court approval on November 1, 1989, after commencement of 
the summary judgment motions and defendants have not had sufficient 
opportunity to discover from witnesses further evidence relating to 
the amount of coverage. Affidavit of Denton Hatch, R. 398-399. 
Appellant's brief states that Mrs. Stevenson "was told 
that First Colony "intended" to decline coverage . . . . Brief of 
Appellant at 5. In fact, Mrs. Stevenson's actual testimony did not 
use the word "intended", but stated that she was told "that First 
Colony had declined coverage on LaMar". R. 154, Transcript of 
Maurine Stevenson Deposition p. 46. (Emphasis added), see Exhibit 
3, p. 46. 
Plaintiff's repeated assertions that LaMar Stevenson did 
not receive notification of the declination by First Colony are 
contradicted by the record. By the end of August, 198 6, the 
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Stevensons knew that First Colony had declined LaMarfs application. 
Maurine Stevenson Deposition at 46. R, 154-158. One month later, 
on October 1, 1986, LaMar Stevenson signed and submitted an 
application for life insurance with Bankers Life Insurance Company 
which specifically disclosed that he had been declined by First 
Colony due to the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy status of his business. R. 
168. See copy of the signature page of the Bankers Life applica-
tion attached to this brief as Exhibit 4 of the Addendum. Clearly, 
LaMar Stevenson had no reasonable expectation of coverage at the 
time of his death. 
Appellant's brief asserts that Mr. Stevenson wanted his 
premium returned and asked Fleiss about the premium. This asser-
tion highlights the disingenuous nature of appellant's claim that 
Mr. Stevenson was not aware of the rejection of his insurance 
application. Certainly he would not expect a return of premium if 
he still anticipated that his insurance application would be 
accepted. 
Appellants assertion that Mr. Stevenson was somehow 
prejudiced by the retention of the premium is further contradicted 
by his wife's testimony in the record. Maurine Stevenson testified 
that she knew First Colony had decxined the application, but 
understood that the premium would be returned to the agent and used 
by him ultimately for coverage with another company. R. 342-343. 
She was not disturbed by the fact that the premium as not returned. 
R. 343. See Exhibit 3 of the Addendum, p. 105, 106. The Steven-
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sons had no immediate need for a return of premium, because Bankers 
Life Insurance Company would not issue a conditional receipt due to 
Mr. Stevenson's rejection by First Colony. In fact, Bankers Life 
would never have accepted a premium until completion of the 
processing of the insurance application, which began two short 
weeks prior to his death. Norman Close, one of the Stevenson's 
agents with Talbert in Denver, testified that Bankers Life re-
guested the application COD, that Bankers Life would not accept a 
conditional receipt and therefore no money was needed with the 
application. Norman Close Deposition p. 86. He further testified 
that the return of premium would not have made any difference with 
respect to the Stevenson's ability to obtain coverage with Bankers 
Life. Norman Close Deposition p. 87. Copies of pages 86 and 87 oi 
the Norman Close Deposition are attached hereto as part of Exhibit 
6 to the Addendum. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, the issuance of a conditional receipt by 
a life insurance company after tender of an applicant's initial 
premium and policy application creates a contract of temporary or 
interim insurance which is subject to the right of the insurer to 
terminate the agreement. All that is necessary for the termination 
of such an agreement is rejection of the application by the 
insurance company and notice of that rejection to the applicant 
during his lifetime. The majority of jurisdictions which have 
considered the question are in agreement with this rule of law. 
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Under this rule of law, it is clear that First Colony 
Life Insurance Company effectively terminated its temporary 
insurance contract with LaMar Stevenson when it rejected his 
application and provided notice of that rejection over one month 
prior to his death. There is no factual issue before this court. 
The record clearly establishes that Mr. Stevenson's application was 
rejected and that he received notice of that rejection. 
The conclusion of the trial court below that a temporary 
contract of insurance cannot be terminated unless the initial 
premium is returned and written notice of rejection of the applica-
tion is conveyed to the applicant is inconsistent with Utah law. 
This court has aligned itself with the view that rejection of the 
application and notice thereof are sufficient to cancel a temporary 
contract of life insurance. 
None of the authorities relied upon by the trial court 
has ever concluded that written notice is required and it is clear 
that the trial court's conclusion that the notice in this case was 
inadequate is erroneous. 
Because there existed no valid contract of insurance at 
the time of LaMar Stevenson's death, this court need not consider 
the question of whether the amount of coverage created by the 
conditional receipt was $3 00,000 or $250,000. Alternatively, there 
is evidence in the record which clearly suggests that the amount of 
coverage created by the conditional receipt was $250,000, and the 
trial court erred in concluding that the amount of coverage was 
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$300,000, particularly where the defendants were not allowed 
sufficient time to do discovery on the question after the court 
allowed plaintiff to amend the complaint to increase her initial 
demand from $250,000 to $500,000. 
Appellant Stevenson's repeated assertions that the 
language of the $300,000 limitation in the conditional receipt is 
somehow unclear and ambiguous are contradicted by a reading of the 
language itself which clearly informs any applicant or average lay 
person not trained in insurance that the amount of temporary 
coverage cannot exceed $300,000. The rule of strict construction 
urged by appellant is therefore inapplicable and the handwritten 
$500,000 amount in the application does not prevail because no 
ambiguity results from considering it together with the language of 
the conditional receipt delivered to LaMar Stevenson. 
The law does not require that the $300,000 limitation of 
the conditional receipt be called to an applicant's attention; 
however, even if it did, the evidence indicates that prior to 
notice of the rejection of his application LaMar Stevenson was 
advised that First Colony would not bind coverage under the 
conditional receipt for more than $250,000 and agreed to this 
limitation. 
The Stevensons were not confused or prejudiced in any way 
by the delay in returning the premium. They knew LaMar had been 
declined by First Colony long before he applied to Bankers Life 
over a month later on October 1, 1986, two weeks before his death. 
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Moreover, the premium was not needed because Bankers Life would not 
issue a conditional receipt nor would it accept a premium until 
acceptance of the application and issuance of a policy, which never 
occurred. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY EFFECTIVELY 
TERMINATED THE TEMPORARY CONTRACT OF LIFE 
INSURANCE BY REJECTING THE INSURANCE APPLICA-
TION AND COMMUNICATING NOTICE OF THE REJECTION 
TO LAMAR STEVENSON PRIOR TO HIS DEATH. 
In Long v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, Inc. , 
29 Utah 2d 204, 507 P.2d 375 (1973), this court considered at 
length the creation and termination of contracts for temporary life 
insurance coverage. There, Mr. Long applied for life insurance, 
made the first premium payment and was given a conditional receipt. 
Seventeen days later he died in an automobile accident. Three days 
after his death, the insurer, through its local agents, attempted 
to give notice to Mr. Long that the application had been rejected 
for "confidential reasons" and attempted to return the premium. 
Id. at 376. After considering the legal effect of the conditional 
receipt, this court adopted the view that the issuance of a 
conditional receipt by an insurance company after tender of an 
applicant's initial premium and policy application creates a 
"contract of temporary or interim insurance" subject to the right 
of the insurer to terminate the agreement. Id. at 377. This court 
then ruled that the conditional receipt 
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created temporary insurance coverage 
until such time as the insurers had considered 
the application and determined to issue a 
policy or reject the risk. Thereafter, the 
insurer cannot terminate the risk so assumed 
unless the insured is notified during his 
lifetime that his application was rejected. 
The facts are undisputed that Mr. Long did not 
receive notice of the company's rejection; and, 
therefore, the company is liable to the 
beneficiary, Mrs. Long. 
Id. at 379. From this court's ruling in Long, it is clear that as 
a matter of Utah law, an insurer terminates its obligations under a 
temporary life insurance contract by rejection of the application 
and notice of the rejection to the applicant during his lifetime. 
In the earlier case of Winger v. Gem State Mutual of 
Utah, 22 Utah 2d 132, 449 P.2d 982 (1969), this court held that no 
contract of insurance existed in favor of the plaintiff where the 
insurer made its determination that he was not insurable and 
elected to decline his application, even though the local agent was 
unable to contact the insured to communicate the declination to him 
prior to his fatal injury two days later. Id. at 983. 
The majority of other jurisdictions which have considered 
this question are in agreement with this rule of law that a 
temporary contract of insurance is terminated by rejection of the 
application and notice of the rejection to the insured. The Ohio 
Supreme Court, for example, has held that an "insurer may not be 
lawfully required to pay a loss against which it had specifically 
refused to insure or be held liable when it had definitely rejected 
the application for insurance and thereby refused to accept the 
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risk." Leube v. Prudential Insurance Co. . 73 N.E.2d 76, 77 (Ohio 
1947) , cited in Quindlen v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Am,, 482 
F.2d 876, 880 (5th Cir. 1973). In Leube, the court upheld the 
trial court's directed verdict which was entered because the 
applicant had received notice of the rejection. 
Even the California Supreme Court, in Smith v. Westland 
Life Insurance Co., 539 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1975), the case relied upon 
by Judge Harding in granting summary judgment to the plaintiff, 
conceded that "the most frequently stated rule appears to be that a 
temporary contract of insurance is terminated by rejection of the 
application and notice thereof to the insured.11 Id. at 439. Couch 
on Insurance likewise states: "The temporary contract is therefore 
effective until either superceded by a policy . . . or terminated 
by a rejection of the application, and notice thereof to the 
insured." 9 Couch on Insurance § 39:208, at 653 (2d Ed. 1985). 
Applying the foregoing legal principle, it is clear that 
First Colony effectively terminated the temporary insurance 
contract in question by rejection of the application and providing 
notice thereof to Stevenson over one and one-half months before his 
accidental death on October 16, 1986. The material facts in this 
issue are not in dispute. By the first of September, 1986, LaMar 
Stevenson received notice of the rejection of his application. 
Mrs. Stevenson testified that Roger Fleiss called her and told her 
that First Colony had declined coverage on LaMar. Maurine 
Stevenson Deposition p. 46. R. 54. She also testified as follows: 
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Q: From the point that Roger Fleiss notified 
you or United Underwriters, whichever it 
was first, you understood that you didn't 
have coverage with First Colony Life; is 
that correct? 
A: Probably. 
Maurine Stevenson Deposition, p. 105, R. 157. 
Later, on October 1, 1986, LaMar Stevenson signed and 
submitted an application for life insurance with Banker's Life 
Insurance Company on which he specifically acknowledged that he had 
been declined by First Colony due to the bankruptcy status of his 
business. See Exhibit 4 of the Addendum, R. 168. In short, the 
undisputed evidence from the record before this court indicates 
that in accordance with Utah law as established in Long, supra, 
First Colony effectively terminated its interim insurance contract 
with LaMar Stevenson by rejection of the application and notice of 
that rejection prior to his death. 
A. Utah Law Does Not Require The Return Of An Appli-
cant's Premium Payment As A Condition For The 
Termination Of A Temporary Contract Of Insurance. 
In her summary judgment motion, plaintiff argued that an 
insurer cannot terminate a temporary insurance contract without 
returning the premium tendered with the application, relying on 
Smith v. Westland Life Insurance Company, 539 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1975), 
and Tripp v. Reliable Life Insurance Co. , 499 P. 2d 1155 (Kan. 
1972). The trial court accepted this argument, and in his memoran-
dum decision quoted, verbatim, the holding of Smith v. Westland. 
See Exhibit 1 of the Addendum. The Smith case is representative of 
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a line of authority adopted by a small minority of courts, which is 
contrary to the majority position adopted by this court in Long, 
supra. In addition, the Smith and Tripp cases are clearly distin-
guishable from this case and are based upon policy considerations 
which are inapplicable. 
As stated above, the California Supreme Court concedes 
that "The most frequently stated rule appears to be that a tem-
porary contract of insurance is terminated by rejection of the 
application and notice thereof to the insured." Smith, 539 P.2d at 
439. This reference in the Smith case is followed by a lengthy 
citation of authorities including Service v. Pyramid Life Insurance 
Company, 440 P.2d 944 (Kan. 1968), which is quoted from with 
approval by this court in Long v. United Benefit Life Insurance 
Co. , 507 P.2d at 377-379. Couch on Insurance agrees that "a 
temporary contract is therefore effective until either superceded 
by a policy . . . or terminated by a rejection of the application, 
and notice thereof to the insured." 9 Couch on Insurance § 39:207, 
at 653 (2d Ed. 1985). This rule terminating temporary insurance 
coverage simply by rejection of the application and receipt of 
notice also squares with the general principle of contract law that 
a party exercising the right to terminate a contract is not 
required to return consideration at the time of communicating the 
recision. 12 Williston, Contracts (3rd Ed. 1970) p. 108 et seq.; 5 
Corbin, Contracts (1960) p. 607 et seq. 
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In addition, both the Smith and Tripp cases are clearly 
distinguishable from this case. As a policy matter, both cases 
focused on eliminating the confusion or uncertainty which might be 
caused by retention of premiums by the insurance carrier. In 
Smith, the insurance company actually issued a policy which 
modified the coverages from the coverages applied for. Mr. Smith 
died within twenty-four hours of his last discussion with a company 
representative, who tried to persuade him to accept the 
modifications. He had been approached twice about the 
modifications and probably expected further contact. 
In Tripp, the court did not adopt a general rule that 
return of premium is always necessary, but specifically confined 
its decision to "the facts disclosed in this record . . . ." 499 
P.2d at 1159. Those facts revealed that the conditional receipt 
specifically stated that the insurance company would issue a policy 
or reject the application within sixty days. The insured died one 
hundred and four (104) days after submission of the application and 
it was undisputed that the insurer failed to comply with the 
provisions of its own conditional receipt, as it had taken no 
action to either reject the application or notify the insured. 
Notwithstanding plaintiff's arguments to the contrary, 
First Colony's delay in returning Stevenson's premium did not cause 
confusion or uncertainty, which prompted the rulings in the Smith 
and Tripp cases. To say that First Colony did not communicate 
unequivocal notification of its decision requires the plaintiff to 
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ignore the record. As indicated above, the plaintiff admits having 
been expressly informed of First Colony's rejection of coverage 
during a conversation with Roger Fleiss in August of 1986. 
Plaintiff admitted she had no reasonable expectation of continued 
coverage under the temporary insurance contract. In such situa-
tions, where "the minds of the parties have met upon the point that 
there is an actual cancellation, or expressly understand that the 
policy is cancelled, formal tender of the premium is not a condi-
tion precedent to cancellation.11 17 Couch on Insurance § 67:240, 
at 693 (2d Ed. 1983). 
Furthermore, the fact that Stevenson was aware of the 
implications of First Colonyfs rejection of his application is 
clearly evidenced by his subsequent application for insurance with 
Banker's Life. Stevenson acknowledged on the Banker's Life 
Application that First Colony had rejected a previous application 
for insurance. R. 168, Exhibit 4 of the Addendum. 
B. Utah Law Does Not Require Written Notice Of Rejec-
tion Of An Insurance Application As A Condition For 
Termination Of A Temporary Contract Of Insurance. 
The trial court appears to have held that the notice of 
rejection of Mr. Stevenson's application was not adequate because 
it was not written. See Memorandum Decision, R. 296, Exhibit 1 of 
the Addendum. This holding appears to be based on an argument from 
Tripp v. Reliable Life Insurance Company, supra, that written 
notice is required; however, nowhere does the opinion in the Tripp 
case make any mention whatsoever of written notice or notification. 
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Plaintiff's opposition memorandum to the First Colony 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 187, attributes the following quote 
to the Tripp case: 
Similarly, in Tripp v. Reliable Life Insurance 
Co, , 210 Kan. 33, 499 P.2d 1155 (1972), the 
Supreme Court of Kansas held, 
"where application for life insurance 
was made, and insurer received the 
initial premium and issued a receipt 
therefor, a policy of temporary 
insurance was created, and said 
policy continued in effect until the 
insurer declined application, sent 
written notification to the insured, 
and returned their premium, notwith-
standing contrary provisions of 
application and receipt." Id. at p. 
1159. 
Record on Appeal, p. 187. (Emphasis added by plaintiff). The 
actual language of the opinion in the Tripp case is as follows: 
We conclude under the facts disclosed in this 
record that when an application for life 
insurance is made and the company receives the 
initial premium and issues a receipt therefor, 
a policy of temporary insurance is created and 
said policy of temporary insurance continues in 
effect until the insurance company declines the 
application, notifies the insured, and returns 
the premium, notwithstanding the provisions of 
the application and the receipt to the con-
trary . 
499 P.2d at 1159. (Emphasis added). Copies of the actual quote 
from plaintiff's memorandum and page 1159 from the Tripp opinion 
are attached as Exhibit 5 of the addendum. In the entire text of 
the Tripp opinion there is no mention of any requirement of written 
notification, and plaintiff's inclusion and underlining of the 
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words "written notification" constitute an egregious misstatement 
of the law, which was relied upon by the trial court. 
In fact, research has failed to disclose even one case 
from any jurisdiction requiring insurance carriers to dispatch 
written notice in order to terminate temporary insurance contracts. 
All that is required is that the insured be " . . . notified during 
his lifetime that his application was rejected." Long, supra, 507 
P.2d at 379. More importantly, a requirement of written notice 
does not square with the ruling of this court in Winger v. Gem 
State Mutual of Utah, 22 Utah 2d 132, 449 P.2d 982 (1969), where on 
facts similar to this case, this court absolved the defendant 
insurer of liability even though the applicant never received Gem 
State's notification of rejection of the application just prior to 
his death. The Winger case does not concern itself with what form 
of notification Gem State pursued, only that the defendant actec 
with "reasonable dispatch" in attempting to communicate its action. 
Id. at 983. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is apparent that Utah cases 
and cases from all other jurisdictions follow the rule that "[i]n 
the absence of a policy requirement of written notice, any communi-
cation of an intent to cancel is sufficient and a writing is not 
required." See 17 Couch on Insurance § 68:140, at 601 (2d Ed. 
1983) . 
Moreover, the accurate language from the Tripp case, 
quoted above, makes it clear that the court's conclusion is 
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confined to the facts disclosed in the record before it, which 
established that Reliable Life Insurance sat on its hands for 104 
days after receiving the Tripp application and attempted to avoid 
coverage after learning of the applicant's death. Id. at 1159. In 
this case, there is no question that First Colony acted with 
reasonable dispatch in both rejecting the application and com-
municating its rejection. Plaintiff acknowledges communications 
with Roger Fleiss in August of 1986, little more than a month and 
one-half after submitting the application. Fleiss provided notice 
that First Colony had rejected the application due to Stevenson's 
bankruptcy. The plaintiff cannot possibly bear the burden of proof 
when she admits that she "probably" knew coverage was terminated 
after talking to Mr. Fleiss. Maurine Stevenson Deposition pp. 4 6-
48, 105-106, R. 221-224. 
No court has ever imposed a requirement of written notice 
for the cancellation of a temporary insurance contract, and the 
trial court's reliance upon plaintiff's misstatements of the law on 
this issue is clearly erroneous. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE 
WAS NOT ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE REJECTION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION. 
In the initial memorandum decision filed by the court 
after consideration of the cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
court stated: "The issue before the court is whether written 
notice and return of premium are required to terminate a temporary 
24 
life insurance contract." R. 296. Exhibit 1 of Addendum. The 
holding of the court, however, simply concludes that " . . . there 
was not adequate notice . . . ." Id. , R. 296. The memorandum 
decision is susceptible to two interpretations on this point. The 
first and most likely is that the trial court concluded that 
written notification is required and that because First Colony did 
not provide written notification prior to Mr. Stevenson's death, 
the notice was inadequate. As argued above, no court in any 
reported decision has ever required written notice, and under Utah 
law, all that is required is that the insured be notified during 
his lifetime that his application was rejected. Long, supra, 507 
P.2d at 379. 
The second, less likely, interpretation is that Judge 
Harding examined the facts of the record in this case and somehow 
concluded that even under the standard of the Long case, Mr. 
Stevenson did not receive notice of the rejection of his applica-
tion. 
To say that the Stevensons did not receive notice of 
First Colony's rejection of the insurance application requires 
plaintiff to ignore the record. Maunne Stevenson testified: "I 
think the next day or two he returned the call, told me that First 
Colony had declined coverage on LaMar". Maurine Stevenson Deposi-
tion p. 46, R. 221, Exhibit 3 of the Addendum. The Bankerfs Life 
application signed by LaMar Stevenson on October 1, 198 6, expressly 
responds "yes" to the question "Have you ever had life or health 
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insurance rated, declined, modified or cancelled?" Below that, the 
application states: "First Colony declination due to a business 
owned filed Chapter 11 - Reorganization." R. 229, Exhibit 4 of 
Addendum. 
There simply is no question of fact on this issue; LaMar 
Stevenson received actual notice of the rejection by First Colony 
of his life insurance application before his death and any con-
clusion by the trial court that he did not receive such notice, or 
that the notice was somehow inadequate, is clearly erroneous. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
AMOUNT OF THE INSURANCE WAS $300,000, AS THERE 
EXISTS AN ISSUE OF FACT CONCERNING THE AMOUNT 
OF COVERAGE CREATED BY THE CONDITIONAL RECEIPT. 
Because First Colony effectively terminated the temporary 
contract of insurance, this court need not consider the questions 
raised in the remainder of this brief and in appellant's brief 
involving the amount of insurance coverage created by the condi-
tional receipt. Plaintiff's entire appeal deals with these issues 
and is responded to in arguments IV through VI below. Alternative-
ly, if this court ultimately considers the question, it must 
determine whether the trial court correctly found that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact as to the amount of insurance, and 
in doing so, must view the facts and inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to First Colony Insurance 
Company, the party against whom summary judgment was granted. 
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Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
The trial court initially signed a judgment in the amount of 
$500,000, but later limited the amount of the judgment to $300,000 
reasoning that plaintiff's judgment should be based upon the 
conditional receipt rather than the policy applied for. Memorandum 
Decision, R. 407. In so doing, the trial court failed to take into 
consideration factual evidence suggesting that the amount of 
insurance created by the issuance of the conditional receipt was 
limited to $250,000. The record in this case contains two af-
fidavits, one from Leonard Reynolds, Executive Vice President of 
United Underwriters, stating unequivocally, that "it is the 
standard practice in the industry not to issue a conditional 
receipt for more than $250,000, this practice was followed by First 
Colony Life." R. 350. Also, Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Loretta 
Stacey indicates that United Underwriters advised Talbert that 
coverage could not be bound for $500,000, and that Mr. Stevenson 
agreed with Talbert that the amount of coverage under the condi-
tional receipt was to be $250,000. R. 351-353. 
Plaintiff's original complaint in this action claimed 
general damages "in the amount of $250,000", R. 4, and defendants 
believe that this was the amount applied for originally by Mr. 
Stevenson. The depositions of Roger Fleiss and Maurine Stevenson 
were taken on May 10 and July 26, 1989; however, defendants did not 
fully discover from Roger Fleiss and Maurine Stevenson facts 
concerning the amount of coverage LaMar applied for, because at the 
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time of the depositions, plaintiff's claim was for $250,000; the 
amount was not at issue. On October 2, 1989, plaintiff filed a 
motion for leave to amend the complaint to raise the amount of 
damages prayed for from $250,000 to $500,000. The amended com-
plaint was filed following court approval on November 1, 1989, 
after commencement of the summary judgment motions in this action 
and defendants have not had a sufficient opportunity to discover 
from the witnesses evidence concerning the amount of coverage 
created by the conditional receipt. See Affidavit of Denton Hatch 
R. 398-399. The court denied First Colony's requests for further 
discovery on this issue and simply ruled based upon his interpreta-
tion of the language of the conditional receipt. In view of the 
recent amendment to the complaint and the factual issues created by 
the affidavits of Leonard Reynolds and Loretta Stacey, the trial 
court erred in ruling on the amount of coverage without allowing 
further time for discovery to resolve factual issues as to the 
amount of coverage under the conditional receipt. 
IV 
THE $300,000 LIMITATION OF THE CONDITIONAL 
RECEIPT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND THEREFORE 
NOT GOVERNED BY THE RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION 
ADVOCATED BY APPELLANT. 
Appellant's Brief repeatedly characterizes the $3 00,00C 
limitation of the conditional receipt as "a limitation in small 
print," (Brief of Appellant at 3, 8, and 18) "not clear enough to 
be binding," (Brief of Appellant at 7), "ambiguous," (Brief of 
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Appellant at 7 and 15), and "neither plain nor conspicuous." (Brief 
of Appellant at 14) . None of these seven conclusory references is 
supported by reference to the actual language of the conditional 
receipt given to LaMar Stevenson which plainly and unambiguously 
states that "the total amount of life insurance . . . which may 
become effective prior to policy delivery cannot exceed $3 00,000." 
R. 152. Exhibit 2 of Addendum. The entire conditional receipt is 
printed on one side of a single page with no "fine or small print," 
and a simple review of the receipt itself by this court will refute 
appellant's conclusory assertions. Appellant completely fails to 
articulate with any degree of specificity what it is about the 
$300,000 limitation of the conditional receipt that is somehow 
unclear or ambiguous. Appellant urges this court to apply a rule 
of strict construction to conclude that the handwritten $500,000 
figure in the application for insurance prevails over the $300,000 
limitation of the conditional receipt and to resolve alleged 
"ambiguities and uncertainties" in favor of the insured. However, 
this court has long held that this rule 
. . . has no application unless there is some 
genuine ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
language upon which reasonable minds may differ 
as to the meaning. 
Auto Lease Company v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., 7 Utah 2d 336, 
325 P.2d 264, 266 (1958). Utah courts, as well as the courts of 
other jurisdictions recognize that if the terms of an insurance 
contract are clear and unambiguous, those terms are to be inter-
preted in accordance with their plain and ordinary meaning. L.D.S. 
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Hospital v. Capital Life Insurance Company, 765 P.2d 857, 858-859 
(Utah 1988); Valley Bank & Trust v. U.S. Life Title Insurance 
Company, 776 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah App. 1989). The plain and 
ordinary meaning of the terms in the conditional receipt before 
this court is evident, even for "the average purchaser of insurance 
who is not trained in law or in the insurance business." Wagner v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 786 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah App. 1990). 
Prior to policy delivery, the amount of coverage cannot exceed 
$300,000. 
The cases cited by appellant invariably deal with 
ambiguous and uncertain policy provisions and are therefore not 
controlling. Prince v. Western Empire Life Insurance Company, 19 
Utah 2d 174, 428 P.2d 163 (1967), for example is cited as an 
example of this court's application of the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations. In Prince it was undisputed that the life insurance 
company had not rejected the application prior to Dr. Prince's 
death, and the only question before the court involved resolving an 
uncertainty as to whether the temporary insurance became effective 
upon completion of the initial medical examination or whether a 
subsequent medical examination ordered by the company, but not 
undertaken prior to the applicant's death, should be determinative. 
It should be noted that in the Prince case this court specifically 
quoted the $50,000 limitation of the conditional receipt (Id. at 
164) and specifically held that Dr. Prince was insured "in an 
amount not exceeding $50,000 . . .", precisely the amount not to be 
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exceeded under the conditional receipt. Id. at 169. Contrary to 
the assertion at page 10 of appellant's brief, it is obvious that 
this court considered the amount of temporary coverage in Prince 
and ruled in accordance with the plain and unambiguous limitation 
of the conditional receipt. 
Thompson v. Occidental Life Insurance Co. , 513 P.2d 353 
(Cal. 1973), is likewise distinguishable. There, the California 
Supreme Court found ambiguity in the statement that the insurer was 
not "required" to insure the applicant in excess of amounts 
specified, noting that nothing in the receipt's language prevented 
the insurer from voluntarily exceeding the amount specified. Id. 
at 364. By contrast, the conditional receipt before this court 
expressly states that the amount cannot exceed $300,000. R. 153, 
Exhibit 2 of Addendum (Emphasis added). 
Appellant cites three cases from the Colorado Court of 
Appeals in support of a general rule that an insurer must use clear 
and unequivocal language evidencing an intent to limit temporary 
coverage and must also call the limiting conditions to the atten-
tion of the applicant. Two of these cases, State Compensation 
Insurance Fund v. Wangerin, 736 P.2d 1246 (Colo. App. 1986) and 
Leland v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 712 P.2d 1060 (Colo. App. 
1985), have nothing to do with temporary life insurance coverage or 
conditional receipts, and appellant's reliance upon these authori-
ties is misplaced. State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Wancrerin 
involved an existing workers compensation policy. Leland v. 
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Travelers Indemnity Co, involved the cancellation and reinstatement 
of an automobile no-fault policy. Appellant's assertion that these 
two Colorado cases have anything to do with temporary coverage is 
simply false. 
Sanchez v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. , 681 
P.2d 974 (Colo. App. 1984) , is also not controlling. The court's 
ruling in Sanchez is confined to the circumstances of the case, 
which did not involve any issue as to the amount of temporary 
coverage. Mr. Sanchez was notified of his rejection as a standard 
risk and requested consideration for non-standard coverage; 
however, the conditional receipt was never delivered to him and he 
was not informed of a provision in the conditional receipt ter-
minating temporary coverage if the applicant was rejected as a 
standard risk. Id. at 976-977. It should also be noted that in 
Sanchez, although the insurance application was for $1,000,000 in 
coverage, the temporary insurance contract was limited to $300,000, 
even though the insured had not received the conditional receipt. 
Likewise, the cases of Puritan Life Insurance Co. v. 
Guess, 598 P.2d 900 (Ala. 1979), and Keene Corp. v. Insurance 
Company of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert, 
den. 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) are not on joint. Puritan Life, supra, 
also involved a conditional receipt which was never delivered to 
the applicant, who paid the initial premium, but died prior to a 
required medical examination. Keene v. INA, supra, is an asbestos 
declaratory judgment action construing the obligations of insurers 
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under comprehensive general liability policies and is yet another 
example of appellant's use of string citations containing cases 
that do not even remotely relate to temporary coverage under a 
conditional receipt. 
Appellant's use of these string citations to argue that 
courts "often" require that limiting conditions of a conditional 
receipt be called to the attention of the insured is inaccurate. 
Appellant cites only two cases, Collister v. Nationwide Life 
Insurance Company, 388 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1978), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 
1089 (1979) and Young v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. , 77 Cal. 
Rptr. 382, 272 Cal. App. 2d 453 (1969), where the court rejected 
clear and unambiguous language in a conditional receipt delivered 
to the applicant because the requirement of a medical examination 
as a prerequisite to temporary coverage was not called to his 
attention. The decisions of these two cases are contrary to the 
clear weight of authority of all other jurisdiction, including 
Utah. 
In Fabrizio v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Co. . 27 
Utah 2, 248, 494 P.2d 953 (1972), this court considered the same 
unambiguous limitation of a conditional receipt rejected in 
Collister and Young, i.e., the requirement that the applicant first 
undergo a medical examination. In upholding the trial court's 
judgment for the defendant insurance company, this court stated: 
The language here provides that the insurance 
take effect "as of the last of any medical 
examinations or tests required under the rules 
and practices of the company or the date of 
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this payment, whichever shall be the later . . 
• • 
We have carefully reviewed the record in this 
case and we do not discover error which would 
require the decision of the trial court to be 
reversed. 
Id. at 955. Utah common law follows the contractual rule that it 
is not the function of a court to rewrite express and unambiguous 
terms in a contract to comport with what might be considered fair 
in a particular situation. Corbin on Contracts, § 559, p. 268 
(1960). Utah common law further agrees with authorities on 
insurance law that ". . . the court is not authorized to rewrite 
the terms of a binder which is clear," 1 Couch on Insurance 2d 
§ 14:36, at 616 (1959). The $300,000 limitation of the conditional 
receipt before this court is simple and unambiguous and therefore 
not controlled by the various rules of strict construction which 
appellant urges this court to apply. 
V 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD INDICATES THAT PRIOR TO 
NOTICE OF THE REJECTION BY FIRST COLONY OF HIS 
APPLICATION, MR. STEVENSON AGREED TO LIMIT 
TEMPORARY COVERAGE TO $250,000 AND THEREFORE 
NEVER HAD ANY EXPECTATION, REASONABLE OTHER-
WISE, OF TEMPORARY COVERAGE IN EXCESS OF 
$250,000. 
Even if it is assumed, for prrposes of argument, that the 
rule of Collister and Young, supra, applies to this case, there is 
evidence in the record (appellants assertions notwithstanding) that 
Mr. Stevenson's agents called to his attention the fact that First 
Colony would not bind coverage under the conditional receipt for 
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any amount in excess of $250,000. As set forth in the factual 
statement above, the affidavit of Loretta Stacey states that United 
Underwriters informed the Talbert office that they could not bind 
coverage with First Colony for $500,000 and the Talbert office 
called Mr. Stevenson, who agreed to drop down to $250,000, which 
would fall within the limits of coverage which could be bound by 
the conditional receipt. Affidavit of Loretta Stacey, R. 353. The 
deposition testimony of Norman Close, one of Mr. Stevenson's agents 
at Talbert confirms the accuracy of this indication. Transcript of 
Deposition of Norman Close at 93, 94, and 98. His testimony on 
page 98 confirms that "LaMar wanted the reduction of the amount to 
$250,000." See Exhibit 6 to the addendum. In addition, prior to 
the amended complaint, the original prayer for relief in this case 
was $250,000. If the Stevensons had any reasonable expectation of 
insurance coverage in excess of $250,000, Maurine Stevenson 
certainly would have conveyed that expectation to counsel prior to 
the filing of the complaint. Under these circumstances, even the 
rule expressed in Young, supra, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 387, would render 
the $300,000 limitation controlling* See, Young v. Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co.. 98 Cal. Rptr. 77, 20 Cal. App. 3d 777 (1971). 
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VI 
THE DELAY IN RETURNING THE PREMIUM DID NOT IN 
ANY WAY CAUSE UNCERTAINTY OR CONFUSION, NOR DID 
IT IN ANY WAY PREJUDICE MR. STEVENSON'S EFFORT 
TO OBTAIN OTHER LIFE INSURANCE. 
By the end of August of 1986, the Stevensons clearly 
understood, as acknowledged by Maurine Stevenson in her deposition 
testimony, "that First Colony had declined coverage on LaMar." 
Maurine Stevenson deposition p. 46, R. 154. They also understood 
that LaMar didn't have coverage with First Colony. Maurine 
Stevenson Deposition, p. 105, R. 157. Over one month later, on 
October 1, 1986, LaMar Stevenson finally reached a decision that he 
was not going to apply for different coverage with a sister company 
to First Colony and signed and submitted an application for life 
insurance with Bankers Life Insurance Company, which application 
specifically disclosed that he had been declined by First Colony. 
R. 168. As a result of that decision, United Underwriters, the 
general agent for First Colony specifically advised Mr. Stevenson's 
agents, Roger Fleiss and Talbert Corporation, that First Colony was 
closing its file and would return the premium within ten days. R. 
256. Clearly, under these circumstances, the retention of the 
premium for the two week period from October 1 to October 16, when 
LaMar Stevenson died, did not lead to the uncertainty and confusion 
which confronted the California Supreme Court in Smith v. Westland 
Life Insurance Co., 539 P.2d at 442 (1975). First Colony had 
unequivocally given notice of its declination weeks earlier and had 
clearly expressed an intention to return the premium. 
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Appellant's contention that the retention of the premium 
prejudiced Mr. Stevenson and that Mthe delay kept Mr. Stevenson 
from obtaining other life insurance" flies in the face of the 
record. Maurine Stevenson, who actually made the premium payment 
and dealt first hand with Mr. Stevenson's agents, testified that 
she knew First Colony had declined the application, but understood 
that the premium would be returned to the agent and used by him 
ultimately for coverage with another company. R. 342-343. She was 
not disturbed by the fact that the premium was not returned. R. 
343. See Exhibit 3 of the Addendum, pp. 105, 106. The Stevensons 
had no immediate need for a return of the premium because Bankers 
Life Insurance Company would not issue a conditional receipt. In 
fact, Bankers Life would never have accepted a premium until 
completion of the processing of the insurance application, which 
began two short weeks prior to Mr. Stevenson's death. Norman 
Close, Mr. Stevenson's agent with Talbert in Denver, testified that 
Bankers Life requested the application COD, that Bankers Life would 
not accept a conditional receipt and tnerefore no money was needed 
with the application. Norman Close Deposition p. 86. Exhibit 6 of 
the addendum. He further testified that the return of premium 
would not have made any difference with respect to the Stevensons' 
ability to obtain coverage with Bankers Life. Norman Close 
Deposition p. 87, Exhibit 6 of addendum. 
Appellant's suggestion that First Colony has somehow 
taken arbitrary action to the disadvantage of Mr. Stevenson is 
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simply inaccurate, and the law of Bonneville Properties, Inc. v. 
Simmons, 677 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1984) and Resource Management Co. v, 
Weston Ranch and Livestock Co. Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah 
1985) is inapplicable to a situation such as this where inadver-
tence in failing to return the premium did not result in any 
disadvantage to Mr. Stevenson. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Utah law, the temporary insurance contract created 
by the conditional receipt was effectively terminated by First 
Colony's rejection of the insurance application and notice of that 
rejection to Mr. Stevenson during his lifetime. It is undisputed 
that Mr. Stevenson received notice of the company's rejection and, 
therefore, First Colony Life Insurance Company is not liable to his 
beneficiary, Mrs. Stevenson. First Colony Life Insurance Company 
respectfully requests that this court reverse the trial court's 
entry of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and remand the 
case to the trial court with directions to enter summary judgment 
in favor of defendant First Colony. 
Respectfully submitted this 2^day of October, 1990. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Dentin M. Hatch' 
Roger R. Fairbanks 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, this day of October, 
1990, to: 
Allen K. Young, Esq, 
Douglas A. Baxter, Esq. 
YOUNG & KESTER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, UT 84663 
D. Gary Christian, Esq. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Talbert Corporation and 
Roger Fleiss 
175 East 400 South, Suite 33C 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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EXHIBIT 1 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ^ ^ 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
********** 
MAURINE STEVENSON as personal 
representative of LAMAR STEVENSON, 
and as trustee of LAMAR D. STEVENSON 
TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, Case Number CV88-875 
-vs- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, TALBERT CORPORATION 
and ROGER FLEISS, 
Defendants. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********** 
The Court, having considered the cross motions for 
summary judgment in this case, will grant plaintiff's motion, 
and will deny defendant First Colony Life's motion. 
The issue before the Court is whether written notice 
and return of the premium are required to terminate a 
temporary life insurance contract. In Smith v. Westland Life 
Insurance Co., The California Supreme Court held: 
Where the insurer has received an application for 
insurance, together with payment of the premium, and 
thereafter decides to reject it, the contract of 
insurance immediately created upon the receipt of the 
application and payment of the premium is not 
terminated until (a) the insurer has actually 
rejected the application and by appropriate notice 
communicated such rejection to the insured, and (b) 
refunded the premium payment to the insured. Smith V. 
Westland Life Ins. Co., 539 P.2d 433 (1975). 
The Court holds that because there was not adequate 
notice that plaintiff's temporary insurance contract had been 
cancelled, and because the premium was not returned timely, 
the contract was in full force and effect at the time of Mr. 
Stevenson's death• 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare a summary judgment 
consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to 
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission 
to the court for signature. 
Dated this 2nd day of January^ 
HARDING, JUDGE--V 
cc: Allen K. Young, Esq. 
Denton M. Hatch, Esq. 
D. Gary Christian, Esq. 
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Tab 2 
EXHIBIT 2 
(Please detach and give to Proposod Insured) 
NOTICE TO PROPOSED INSURED - PART I 
In connection with yourapplication for insurance, an investigative consumer report may be prepared whereby information is obtained through personal in 
erviews with your family, friends, neighbors, business associates, financial sources, or others with whom you are acquainted This inquiry includes infor 
"nation as to your character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living If an investigative consumer report is prepared in connectioi 
with your application, you may receive a copy of that report upon written request to the Company 
nformation regarding your insurability will be treated as confidential Hrst Colony Life Insurance Company or its reinsurers may, however, make a brie 
eport thereon to the Medical Information Bureau, a non-profit membership organization ol life insurance companies, which operates an informational ex 
;hange bureau on behalf of its members If you apply to another Bureau member company tor hie or health insurance coverage, or a damn for benefits u 
submitted to such a company, the Bureau, upon request, will supply such company with the information it may have m its We 
Jpon receipt of request from you, the Bureau will arrange disclosure of any information it may have in your die NO IT (Medical information will be disclosec 
)nly to your attending physician ) If you question the accuracy of information in the Bureau's file, you may contact the Bureau and seek a correction in ac 
ordance with the procedures set forth in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act The address of the Bureau's information office is Post Office Box 105, Esse> 
Station, Boston, Massachusetts 02112 Tel (617) 426-3660 
"irst Colony Life Insurance Company or its reinsurers may also release information in its file to other life insurance companies to whom you may apply for life 
ir health insurance, or to whom a claim for benefits may be submitted 
FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, P.O. Box 1280, Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 Tel (804) 845-0911 
CONDITIONAL RECEIPT No. L 0 9 4 2 2 7 7 
This receipt is to be issued if payment is made at the time the application is signed, otherwise, it must not be detached. 
The conditions specified in Paragraph "FIRST" must be fulfilled exactly if insurance is to become effective prior to policy delivery. Neither the agen 
or the medical examiner is authorized to alter or waive these conditions. 
received from (DfO./niXIAJ ^J7^.LPyn^jy>T) this 7 T " A ~ da> 
.the sum of $__ /*>£> in connection with this applicatior f 
Dr life insura^e to the (Jbmpany This receipt bears the same date and number as the application. 
IRST. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT UNDER WHICH INSURANCE MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE PRIOR TO POLICY DELIVERY. 
F all the following conditions are fulfilled exactly. 
(1) All medical exams, tests, X-rays, and EKG's required by Company rules must be completed 
(2) The first modal premium for the amount of insurance which may become effective prior to policy delivery must be received with this applica 
tion. 
(3) On the datelhat insurance becomes effective under the terms of this receipt, each person to be covered musl be insurable at the class of ns^ 
applied for, for the plan and amount applied for, without change and at the rate of premium paid. 
HEN insurance as provided by the policy applied for and for an amount not exceeding that specified in Paragraph "SECOND" wiii become effect ve on the 
itest of. 
(1) the date of Part I of this application; 
(2) the date of completion of all medical exams, tests, X-rays, and EKG's required by Company rules; and 
(3) the Date of Issue, if any, requested in the application 
ny alternate or additional insurance applied for will not become effective under this receipt. 
ECOND. LIMITS PROVISION MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF INSURANCE WHICH MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE PRIOR TO POLICY DELIVERY 
he total amount of life insurance and ADB which may become effective prior to policy delivery cannot exceed $300,000. This amount includes any in 
jrance and ADB previously issued or applied for in the Company 
HIRD. RETURN OF AMOUNT REMITTED. 
he sum paid in exchange for this receipt will be returned upon demand and surrender of this receipt if: 
(1) no insurance becomes effective under the terms of this receipt, or 
(2) the Company declines this application 
his receipt is not valid unless signed by the agent who receives payment THE PREMIUM MUST BE PAID BY CHECK OR MONEY ORDER MADE PAYABLE 
D THE COMPANY. DO NOT MAKE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER PAYABLE TO THE AGENT OR LEAVE THE PAYEE BLANK. Any check or money order given in 
ayrrent ol this premium must be honored on the first presentation for pavment II you do not hear from the Company legarding the proposed insurance 
ithin 60 da\st notify the Company at its home office in Lynchbuig, Virginia Give the name of the agent, date and amount paid, and the number of this 
ceipt 
^tiz\\lciJLd^^ this <^4 -7^ -y^ QnUJ t/f^^s j£_— 
Tab 3 
EXHIBIT 3 
UhKIIHhUUUPY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-—000O000 
MAURINE STEVENSON as 
personal representative of 
LAMAR STEVENSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, TALBERT CORPORATION 
and ROGER FLEISS, 
Defendants. 
FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs . 
UNITED UNDERWRITERS AGENCIES, 
T h i r d - P a r t y D e f e n d a n t . 
Civil No. CV-88-875 
Deposition of: 
MAUREEN STEVENSON 
(Judge Ray Harding) 
instan 
Roge 
Centie 
on the 
before 
Licens 
Ucah. 
Deposition of MAUREEN STEVENSON, taken at the 
e and request of Defendants Talbert Corporation and 
Fleiss, at the law offices of Kipp & Christian, City 
I, Suite 330, 175 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
26th day of July, 1989, at the hour of 10:15 a.m., 
DENISE M. THOMAS, a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Utah 
e No. 129, and Notary Public in and for the State of 
oooOooo 
Associated Professional Bi3Dorters 
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2. had n o t y e t r e c e i v e d t h e p o l i c y and we were c o n c e r n e d . , 
2 Q When you c a l l e d R o g e r ' s o f f i c e on t h e o c c a s i o n 
3 y o u ' r e t e l l i n g me a b o u t , you i d e n t i f i e d y o u r s e l f , I p r e s u m e ? 
4 A Oh, y e s . 
5 Q Did this man seem to know who you were? 
6 A Yes. 
7 J Q When you t a l k e d a b o u t t h e p o l i c y , d i d t h i s man ^^em 
t o know a b o u t t h e p o l i c y ? 
9 I A He s a i d he d i d n ' t know wha t t h e s t a t u s w a s , t h a t he 
10 would c h e c k i t o u t and g e t back t o me. 
11 Q Did h e ? 
12 A Y e s . 
13 Q How much longer? 
14 A I think the next day or two he returned the call, 
15 told me that First Colony had declined coverage on Lamar. I 
16 asked why, because he had cleared everything in the physical 
17 aspect. He said because we were in a Chapter 11, the company 
18 was in a Chapter 11. 
19 Q Was it? 
20 A Y e s . And I s a i d , "What d o e s t h a t h a v e t o do w i t h 
21 l i f e c o v e r a g e on L a m a r ? " And t h e f e l l o w s a i d , "You h a v e t o 
22 u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e n t a l i t y of an i n s u r a n c e c o m p a n y , " and I s a i d 
23 o k a y . "What do you mean?" He s a i d , "They do n o t want t o 
24 i s s u e a p o l i c y when someone i s in t h a t s o r t of f i n a n c i a l 
25 j p o s i t i o n , " and I s a i d , "Why?" He s a i d , " B e c a u s e of a 
CC Exhibi t 8 M £ C : I F T 
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j p o s s i b i l i t y of s u i c i d e , " and I s a i d , "Wel l , s o . With s u i c i d e 
2 the p o l i c y i s n ' t in e f f e c t anyway." I had no comprehension of 
3 what he was t r y i n g to t e l l me, and he s a i d , "Well , t h e r e have 
4 been such o c c a s i o n s when s u i c i d e s have been done and looked 
5 for r e a l as an a c c i d e n t , " and so they were j u s t - - F i r s t 
6 Colony had backed off because of those r e a s o n s . 
7 Q Now, when t h i s man, whatever h i s name was, was 
8 g i v i n g you t h e i n fo rma t ion you have j u s t d e s c r i b e d , did you 
9 unde r s t and t h a t he was t e l l i n g you something t h a t was coming 
10 from the company or something he was making up and t e l l i n g 
11 you? How d id you t ake t h a t ? 
12 A I h a d n ' t t hough t of t h a t . 
13 Q Or d id you take i t in any s e n s e ? 
14 A No, I r e a l l y d i d n ' t , j u s t as t h e f a c t s of what was 
15 taking place. 
16 Q Who did you talk to next? 
17 A Roger then called. He returned — 
18 Q How long after? 
19 A Just shortly. The next day or so forth. 
20 Q Okay. 
21 A He again reiterated basically what was said by the 
22 fellow in his office and that he didn't see any problem 
23 because he could get Lamar right into another company who he 
24 didn't see would give this same reasoning or any problem about 
25 securing the policy. 
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Q Did Roger give you any more explanation or talked 
about the Chapter 11 or suicide that this other fellow was 
talking about? 
A I don't recall if we got really into that. I 
suppose we did. I don't remember anything specifically. 
Q What sticks in your mind was that Roger confirmed 
yes, First Colony won't issue the policy and we'll just try to 
get you somewhere else? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that what it was? 
Yes. 
Any more discussion than that? 
He just said that it had been so recent since Lamar 
had had a physical and all of the other things was in place 
that all that would be required would be an updated urine 
specimen and that he would have a kit sent to us to accomplish 
that. 
Q About when did this conversation take place, Mrs. 
Stevenson? 
A This was at the end of August. 
Q Who did you talk to next? 
A Roger himself. 
Q How much longer? 
A Within a week or two weeks. 
Q Was that a call you initiated? 
A 
Q 
A 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 156 
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Q You may or may not have received it, but you don't 
recall it? 
A That's correct. 
Q It was your understanding, I believe you said, that 
when you wrote the check, Exhibit 17, you understood that you 
had coverage with First Colony? 
A Yeah. 
Q But you unders tood t h a t t h a t e x i s t e d up t o , I t h ink 
you s a id e a r l i e r , a c e r t a i n p o i n t t h a t you had d i s c u s s e d , and 
I assume you meant by t h a t s t a t e me n t when you were n o t i f i e d by 
Roger F l e i s s t h a t F i r s t Colony w o u l d n ' t cover you? 
A Thatfs correct. 
Q From the p o i n t t h a t Roger F l e i s s n o t i f i e d you or 
United U n d e r w r i t e r s , whichever i t was f i r s t , you unders tood 
t h a t you d i d n ' t have coverage with F i r s t Colony L i f e ; i s t h a t 
c o r r e c t ? 
A P r o b a b l y , 
Q When you wrote t he premium and you gave i t to Roger 
or T a l b e r t C o r p o r a t i o n , and when they s t a r t e d to look for 
ano ther p o l i c y for you, i t was your u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w a s n ' t i t , 
t h a t you would n o t r e c e i v e the premium back - -
A Yes . 
Q — the refund back? 
A That's correct. 
Q You knew that First Colony had denied your 
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1 I a p p l i c a t i o n , b u t you u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e premium would be 
2 r e t u r n e d t o Roger or h i s company and t h a t t h e y would r e u s e i t , 
3 r e a p p l y i t i n - h o u s e t o a new p o l i c y ; i s t h a t c o r r e c t ? 
4 A Y e s , 
5 Q So t h e f a c t t h a t you d i d n ' t h a v e i t in hand d i d n ' t 
6 d i s t u r b y o u ; i s t h a t r i g h t ? 
7 A T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
8 Q You j u s t assumed t h a t i t was b e i n g t a k e n c a r e of by 
9 Roger and h i s company? 
10 A Y e s . I had c o m p l e t e t r u s t in Roger a s an a g e n t 
11 t h a t t h e s e t h i n g s w e r e h a n d l e d in h i s e x p e r t i s e a s an a g e n t . 
12 Q Did someone t e l l you t h a t ' s t h e way i t would 
13 h a p p e n , o r d i d you j u s t a s sume t h a t ? 
14 A No. No one s p e l l e d i t o u t , n o . 
15 Q Did someone t e l l you when you w r o t e o u t t h e $410 
16 c h e c k , E x h i b i t 1 7 , t h a t c o v e r a g e was in f o r c e a t t h a t t i m e ? 
17 A No, I d o n ' t t h i n k a n y o n e s p e c i f i c a l l y s a i d t h a t . 
18 Q How a r e you s u p p o r t i n g y o u r s e l f now? 
19 A I ' m l i v i n g on S o c i a l S e c u r i t y . 
20 Q I s t h a t y o u r o n l y s o u r c e of i n c o m e ? 
21 A Y e s . 
22 Q Did you ever talk to Roger Fleiss about whether he 
23 had authority to issue binding insurance when you gave his 
24 company the check, Exhibit 17? 
25 A Did I have any discussions about that? No. 
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EXHIBIT 4 
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^8 LIFE COMPANY DES MOINES. IOWA 50307 INSURANCE APPLICATION 
N2 J U b l Z d 
Yes 
Do you plan to live or travel (other than vacation) outside of the U.S.? D 
No_ 
Have you ever had life or health insurance rated, declined, modified j x cancelled? 
>^ Have you ever requested or received benefits because of injury or sickness? ID s i 
Do you have an application for life or disability income insurance pending in any company, or have you within the 
last three months applied for such insurance? • 
J)Have you, or do you plan to engage in hang kite gliding, scuba or sky diving, stock, modified, sports car, drag 
D ETi 
• BT strip, motorcycle, motor boat, snowmobile or other type of racing? 
) Do you plan to fly or have you, within the last five years flown as a pilot, student pilot or crew member? j g ^ Q_ 
Are you or do you intend to become a member of a military^ervice?_ 
Driver's license number . 
D 0-1 
In the last 2 years have you been charged with: 
(a) 2 or more motor vehicle moving violations or accidents? B^D 
(b) driving while intoxicated? • B-T 
(c) suspension or revocation of your license? 
'Have you in the last five years been arrested for other than traffic violations? 
g ETC 
• &rf 
Are you in a regular exercise program (jogging, swimming, etc.)? 
B^D i Any family history of heart or kidney disease, high blood pressure or cancer? 
Within the last 5 years have you: 
(a) been treated or counselled or joined an organization for alcohol or drug use? I • [ g -
(b) used amphetamines, barbiturates, sedatives, LSD, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, or morphine, except as j j 
prescribed by a doctor? i • EEK~"" 
"Yes" answers to 33, 34 and 35 require Sports, Aviation, Military Statement respectively. Explain or give reasons 
if "Yes" for questions 29 - 32 and 36 - 40. 
^present that ail statements in this application are true and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand they 
5 the basis of any insurance issued. I agree that, except as the Conditional Receipt provides, the Company shall incur no liability 
less and until: (1) a policy is issued (2) the policy is received and accepted by the applicant and (3) the first premium is paid. I 
ree that these three conditions must occur while, as far as the applicant knows, there has been no change since the^late of this j 
m in the health or any other factor affecting the insurability of any person proposed for insurance. I agree that only the Home 
fice is authorized to pass on insurability or to make, change or discharge any contract or waive any of the Company's rights. I 
ree that the right to change the beneficiary is reserved to the owner unless otherwise provided in question 19. Any change in 
;ue age, amount, class, plan or benefits made by the Company shown under "Amendments" is subject to my written ratification. 
inderstand the laws of the state listed below shall apply to any policy issued. 
This application is COD OR • I have paid S for • Life • Disability Income insurance. If money paid 
lave been given the Conditional Receipt in return. I have read it, and understand and agree to its terms. 
Signature of Applicant or Owner (if other than 
Proposed insured) If Owner is Corporation, 
Officer other than Proposed Insured should sign. 
Signature of Proposed Insured 
(only if over age 9) 
gned at 
City 
JMhL 
State 
Signature of Parent if 
^ P r o p o s e d insured js j jnder age 15 
,C^ - /,. j1% W\\ne$^2£L A\UA^ 
Date Aaent 
Print? 3 
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EXHIBIT 5 
other, the retention of the premium indicates that the immediate 
insurance he was getting for his money is still continuing. This 
uncertainty in which the applicant finds himself can be resolved by 
conditioning termination on both notice of rejection and refund of 
premium. Such a rule will at the same time go far in eliminating risk 
of unfairness to the applicant, where the circumstances surrounding 
the rejection of his application and notification thereof to him are 
disputed. In addition, our decision to adopt this rule is fortified by 
the fact that it is unconscionable for an insurance company to hold 
premiums without providing coverage." Smith, at p. 442-443. 
Similarly, in Tripp v. Reliable Life Insurance Co.. 210 Kan. 33, 499 P.2d 1155 
(1972), the Supreme Court of Kansas held, 
"where application for life insurance was made, and insurer received 
the initial premium and issued a receipt therefor, a policy of 
temporary insurance was created, and said policy continued in effect 
until the insurer declined application, sent written notification to the 
insured, and returned their premium, notwithstanding contrary 
provisions of application and receipt." Id. at p. 1159. 
In a recent appellate court decision in the ninth circuit, the court held, "Telephonic 
notification of an insured that he is not insurable is insufficient to terminate a temporary 
insurance contract created by an insurance application." State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. 
v. Khoe, 872 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1989; pending petition for re-hearing). 
C. Utah courts also require notice to terminate temporary insurance contracts. 
Although the above opinions are not Utah cases, Utah courts have considered 
similar issues, and have almost universally required notice to the insured of the insurer's 
rejection of their application. In Winger v. Gem State Mutual of Utah, 22 Utah 2d 132, 
449 P.2d 982 (1969), cited by defendants in their motion, the court emphasizes in its 
decision the fact that the insurer acted within a reasonable time in making its determination 
that the applicant was not insurable, and in attempting to communicate with the insured its 
action in declining his application. 
5 
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one year as there were days intervening 
between the date of the application and 
the approval. In other words, the insured 
would be paying for something which 
he did not receive. . . . " (p. 214, 440 
R2d 959.) 
The defendant distinguishes Service from 
the facts in the instant case for the reason 
that in Service a regional manager of the 
defendant company had the same power as 
a general agent and that his statement to 
the applicant, that the applicant was cover-
ed on receipt of the initial premium, was 
binding on the company. We do not have a 
general agent in this case. However, the 
import of the reasoning in Service, as far 
as temporary insurance was concerned, was 
not based on the status of the agent who 
made the statement binding the coverage. 
We recognize that the death of the ap-
plicant in the Service case occurred during 
the sixty-day period. The insured's child 
in the instant case died forty-five days aft-
er the sixty days had passed. The reason-
ing in Service, supporting the theory of 
temporary insurance, is consistent with an 
extension of the doctrine of temporary in-
surance until the company acts upon the ap-
plication. 
This is also in accord with the rule of 
law established in Waldner and Harvey, 
that the company, having received the 
premium, had a reasonable time and no 
more than a reasonable time in which to 
act. It should be pointed out that in the 
application made by the plaintiff for in-
surance it was provided that the company 
would have sixty days from the date of 
the receipt of the application to determine 
the insurability of the applicant, and the 
application further provided that sixty days 
was deemed to be a reasonable period. In 
view of this it would logically follow that 
the insurance company should have return-
ed the premium at the end of the sixty-day 
period since they had agreed in writing that 
this was the extent of the time they need-
ed to determine the insurability of the ap-
plicant. Any delay in returning the premi-
um thereafter falls directly under the rule 
established in Waldner and Han'ey. 
[4] The only reason for failure to re-
turn the premium at the end of the sixty 
days would be that the company was still 
contemplating issuing the policy. We can-
not support a rule which would permit an 
insurance company to make a decision on an 
application after the insured's death. We 
conclude under the facts disclosed in this 
record that when an application for life 
insurance is made and the company receives 
the initial premium and issues a receipt 
therefor, a policy of temporary insurance 
is created and said policy of temporary in-
surance continues in effect until the insur-
ance company declines the application, noti-
fies the insured, and returns the premium, 
notwithstanding the provisions of the appli-/ 
cation and the receipt to the contrary. 
The defendant argues that attorney fees 
should not be allowed in this case for the 
reason that the defendant had in good faith 
a reasonable basis for refusing to pay the 
plaintiff's claim. We have stated in many 
instances that the allowance of attorney 
fees depends upon the facts and circum-
stances of each particular case and only 
when the insurer refuses without just cause 
or excuse to pay in accordance with the 
terms of the policy can an allowance be 
made to the insured for reasonable 
attorney fees. (Parker v. Continental Cas-
ualty Co., 191 Kan. 674, 383 P.2d 937.) 
[5] In view of the necessity of con-
struing the language of the application and 
the receipt for the first time as applied to 
the facts disclosed by this record we feel 
the defendant had just cause and excuse to 
refuse payment; therefore, no attorney fees 
should be allowed. Costs are assessed 
against the defendant. 
The judgment is affirmed in part and re-
versed in part. 
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2 I IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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5 |DEPOSITION OF: NORMAN CLOSE, January 23, 1990 
6 
MAURINE STEVENSON, as personal representative of 
7 I LAMAR STEVENSON, 
8 Plaintiff, 
10 I FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, TALBERT CORPORATION and 
iROGER FLEISS, 
11 
12 
Defendants. 
13 FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
14 Third-Party Plaintiff, 
15 v. 
16 UNITED UNDERWRITERS AGENCIES, 
17 Third-Party Defendant. 
18 
19 | PURSUANT TO NOTICE, the deposition of NORMAN CLOSE was 
taken on behalf of the Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiff at 
20 |1120 Lincoln Street, Suite 1100, Denver, Colorado 80203, on 
January 23, 1990 at 2 p.m., before Jill L. Webster, Registered 
21 |Professional Reporter and Notary Public within Colorado, 
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at would be my supposition. 
You have to understand, I don't have a lot of 
that money. Like I said before, in the majority of 
my experience, the money went to the insured. And 
difficult time trying to find out when the money 
If that was her plan—that is, that she would not 
ck, but the agent would reapply it—if that was her 
plan, you were entirely unaware of it; is that correct? 
A. 
Q. 
Life? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
underwriting 
they would ma 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Life? 
A. 
Q. 
premium that 
A. 
That's correct. 
Did you need it for your re-application to Bankers 
Bankers Life requested the application COD. 
What does that mean? 
They would underwrite the case, look at the 
material, look at the exam from First Colony before 
ke a decision. 
They would not accept a conditional receipt? 
That's correct. 
Did you not need the money to apply to Bankers 
No. 
So was there any advantage lost by not having the 
you know of? 
Advantage to Maurine? 
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within ten 
October 18, 
would be an 
A. 
can answer 
Q. 
you have an 
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To the Stevensons. Were they prejudiced in any 
having the premium? 
You'll have to explain that one to me. 
As far as being able to obtain other insurance. 
Would having the money made the insurance go in 
Bankers Life? 
Yes. 
The answer is no. 
So having the money would not have made any 
with respect to their ability to obtain coverage? 
They're only accepting the application, not a 
receipt. 
So the answer to that question is it would not 
difference? 
No. Yesf it would not have made any difference. 
If First Colony said they would return the premium 
days on September 29, and it was not returned by 
do you have an opinion as to whether or not that 
unreasonable length of time? 
MR. BAXTER: Object to the form of the question. 
How do I respond to that? 
MR. BAXTER: That just goes on the record. You 
his question, if you can. 
(BY MR. HATCH) This is a yes or no question. Do 
opinion as to whether 19 days, basically what Ifm 
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Q. Have you seen that before? 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. Does that refresh your recollection about'— 
A. $250,000, yes. 
Q. It does? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What do you recall? 
A. I had forgotten when and how we arrived at that, 
Q. Is this memo accurate, to the best of your 
recollection? 
A. Yeah, I guess. I think so. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I have three questions. May I? 
Q. Sure. 
A. In the middle of the memo it says, "There's no 
covering letter." Is there anything that has come out that 
describes what that means? I have no idea what that means. 
Q. Not to my knowledge. It says, "July 13, a 
conditional receipt signed by Norm Close was mailed to 
Stevensons. There was no covering letter." I guess we don't 
have a cover letter in the file and—not that I know of. 
MR. CHRISTIAN: What's Mr. Close supposed to do 
with this now? 
Q. (BY MR. HATCH) Go ahead and ask your questions 
and I'll ask you a question. 
94 
A. I would probably disagree with the one statement 
that says, "Final notice of declination was advised by United 
Underwriters," because my understanding, as per our 
notice—Chris's chronology was the file was closed, and I 
believe that the declination was in August. And so my 
understanding would conflict with this, as far as this final 
notice of declination, because in my opinion and in Roger's 
understanding, we were done in August. 
Q. (BY MR. HATCH) With respect to the $250,000, is 
that— 
A. I guess it surprises me. And I didn't have 
anything down in my file about when we decided to do it and how 
it was done, and it's just missing from my recollection of it 
entirely when and how and what the process was. 
Q. Well, let's be clear. Now, can you say whether or 
not that is accurate? 
A. I believe it to be accurate. 
Q. Look at the next one. When I say that and when 
you say you believe it to be accurate, we're talking about the 
$250,000 question, right? 
A. Yes. What it indicates to me is that we didn't 
make that adjustment, or the adjustment was requested while the 
policy was in underwriting. Which would mean that if the policy 
was issued, it would have come out with an amendment, which is 
First Colony's standard procedure to say we've reduced the face 
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getting confused with that letter, but I thought there was 
too. 
Q. (BY MR. HATCH) Just to be clear, ba 
your understanding the reduction—Lamar wanted 
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Supposition. 
Based on your experience with United 
owf is that what you're telling me? 
I can give you my best opinion of wh 
s at First Colony. Either Lynchburg 
ere the underwriting is, because the 
Colony. 
You did not bring any documents with 
>uant to the subpoena; is that correct? 
A. 
represented h 
No. Everything that I know that exi 
ere, or was duplicated from the files 
Talbert Corporation. 
You 
MR. HATCH: Gary's already produced 
didn't have any new ones? 
MR. CHRISTIAN: I understand I have 
[file. I havenft checked. 
MR. GILL: As far as I know, that's 
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or in 
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